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Abstract 
This article examines the complaint that arbitrary algorithmic decisions wrong those 
whom they affect.  It makes three contributions.  First, it provides an analysis of what 
“arbitrariness” means in this context.  Second, it argues that arbitrariness is not of 
moral concern except when special circumstances apply. However, when the same 
algorithm or different algorithms based on the same data, are used in multiple contexts, a 
person may be arbitrarily excluded from a broad range of opportunities.  The third 
contribution is to explain why this systemic exclusion is of moral concern and to offer a 
solution to address it.  
 
 
 A hiring manager faces a towering stack of resumes from which she must choose 
a short list of candidates to interview. A lender flips rapidly through files, evaluating the 
loan-worthiness of applicants based on decades of credit reports and income statements. 
When time is short but information ample, humans struggle to decide quickly and fairly. 
  Private companies and state agencies alike often turn to automated decision-
making systems to aid or replace their overburdened human experts. These systems offer 
the promise of ease and consistency. Their creators describe them as unbiased substitutes 
for faulty human judgment, although whether they do help to minimize human bias is 
controversial.1 
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1 For discussion of algorithmic bias, see among others Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data 
Policing Surveillance, Race, and the Future of Law Enforcement; Chouldechova, “Fair 
Prediction with Disparate Impact”; Safiya, Algorithms of Oppression; Eubanks, 
Automating Inequality. 
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 Automated decision-making systems implemented in public life are typically 
highly standardized. Few private companies or state agencies have the technical 
capacities to build their own automated decision-making systems. Many companies and 
state agencies rush to the same private providers: over one third of the Fortune 100 
companies use the same automated candidate screener, Hirevue. 
 Given this standardization, one algorithmic decision-making system can replace 
or influence thousands of unique human deciders. Each of the humans so replaced had 
their own set of decision-making criteria.2  Some criteria were morally and epistemically 
good. Some criteria were perniciously biased. And some criteria were merely arbitrary. 
An individual hiring manager, for example, might choose to interview only candidates 
wearing purple shoelaces or hire only those who enjoy puns.  Is such arbitrariness of 
moral concern?  This is the first question we address, focusing on algorithmic decision-
making in domains that do not provide specific criteria to guide decision-making.  We 
argue, perhaps counterintuitively, that isolated arbitrary decisions are not of moral 
concern, except when other rights make non-arbitrariness relevant.3     
 The second question we address is whether arbitrariness becomes problematic 
when it goes to scale.  The single automated decision-making system that replaces a 
thousand human decision makers has its own sets of good, biased, and arbitrary criteria. 
Since no decision-making system is perfect, some qualified people will be misclassified 
by any system. If the same algorithms produced by the same companies are uniformly 
applied across wide swathes of a single domain, hiring or lending, for example, a person 
could be irrationally excluded from a significant number of important opportunities.  
This, we argue, becomes a problem of moral concern.   
 Importantly, this harm is likely to persist even when the automated decision-
making systems are "fair" on standard metrics of fairness.4  The algorithm might mandate 
 
2 We focus here on replacement but note that in some cases an algorithmic decision-
making system that merely plays an advisory role can lead to outcomes with more 
disparate impact than either human or algorithmic decision-making alone. See Albright, 
“If You Give a Judge a Risk Score: Evidence from Kentucky Bail Decisions.” 
3 The criminal justice context is a good example of this phenomenon.   
4 There has been an explosion of literature on fairness in machine learning. For the 
purposes of this paper, we will remain neutral as to a metric of fairness. For an overview 
and discussion see Gilpin et al., “Explaining Explanations: An Approach to Evaluating 
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that a score is equally predictive for all groups protected by antidiscrimination law; that a 
certain percentage of applicants from an underrepresented group are chosen; that false 
positive or false negative rates for these different groups of people are equalized; or that 
attributes such as race or gender are not relied upon, explicitly or implicitly, in decision-
making.5 Any one of these forms of fairness could be maintained while the algorithm 
nevertheless persistently mischaracterizes the same individuals.  
 We will argue that arbitrariness is sometimes morally problematic, but not for the 
reasons that other scholars posit. In our view, the problem with arbitrary algorithms is not 
arbitrariness but systematicity.  Automated decision-making systems that make uniform 
judgments across broad swathes of a sector, which we might call algorithmic Leviathans 
for short, limit people’s opportunities in ways that are morally troubling.  If this is 
correct, then this moral problem will plague both arbitrary and non-arbitrary algorithms.  
We thus recommend solutions aimed at disrupting the systematicity of algorithmic 
Leviathans rather than the arbitrariness of their decision-making.  
 At this point, the reader may be wondering about the relationship between the first 
claim and the second.  We argue that the arbitrariness of algorithms is not of moral 
concern and that the systemic exclusion they often yield is.  What connects these claims?  
The answer lies in the fact that the problematic nature of systemic exclusion is often 
attributed to its arbitrariness, a confusion we hope to dispel.  In addition, while we argue 
that individuals have no right that employers and lenders, to take two common examples, 
make decisions about hiring and lending that are non-arbitrary, when the decision is non-
arbitrary, there is at least some reason in its favor.  This weak justification becomes 
relevant when arbitrariness occurs at scale because the harm produced by systemic 
exclusions requires justification.   
 
Interpretability of Machine Learning”; Mehrabi et al., “A Survey on Bias and Fairness in 
Machine Learning.” For further discussion see Hardt, Price, and Srebro, “Equality of 
Opportunity in Supervised Learning”; Sánchez-Monedero, Dencik, and Edwards, “What 
Does It Mean to ‘solve’ the Problem of Discrimination in Hiring?”; Hellman, “Measuring 
Algorithmic Fairness.” 
5 Whether one could eliminate the ways in which an algorithm implicitly relies on 
protected traits is controversial, see Hu and Kohler-Hausmann, “What’s Sex Got to Do 
with Machine Learning?” 
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 The argument in this article proceeds as follows.  First, we present an argument 
against the view that an isolated arbitrary decision morally wrongs the individual whom it 
misclassifies. Second, we argue for the view that when arbitrariness becomes systemic, as 
it is likely to do when particular algorithmic tools dominate markets, new and important 
moral problems arise. Finally, we propose technically informed solutions that can lessen 
the impact of algorithms at scale and so mitigate or avoid the wrong we identify. 
 
2 Do Arbitrary Decisions Wrong Individuals? 
 
 We begin with the claim that arbitrary decisions wrong individual persons.  In 
order to assess this claim, we need to get a clear picture of what makes a decision 
arbitrary.  As we show in this section, there are many possible ways to understand a 
claim that a decision is arbitrary.  After isolating the meaning of this assertion that seems 
to best cohere with familiar complaints and which seems apt for the context of 
algorithmic decision-making, we argue that the complaint that an algorithmic decision is 
arbitrary lacks moral force.   
 
2.1  Arbitrary decision-making as unpredictable, unconstrained or unreasonable 
 
 When a person asserts that a decision is arbitrary, what might she mean?  To start, 
here are three different understandings of arbitrariness.  An arbitrary decision might be 
one that is unpredictable.  Second, an arbitrary decision might be one that is 
unconstrained by ex ante rules or standards.  Third, an arbitrary decision could be a 
decision that is unreasonable or nonsensical.  Let’s consider each in turn.  In doing so, we 
focus on the context of employment and lending, and so on the decisions of employers 
and lenders.  We focus on these two specific contexts in order to make the discussion 
concrete and easy to follow but we believe that what we have to say about whether 
arbitrary decisions wrong individuals is generalizable beyond these contexts.    
 Perhaps arbitrary is a synonym for unpredictable and the claim of arbitrary 
decision-making is the claim that a decision is unfairly unpredictable.  If so, it rests on the 
assertion that a prospective employee or borrower has a right to a hiring or lending 
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process that is predictable.  People surely have an interest in the ability to plan that is 
made difficult when employers and lenders act unpredictably.  But do they have a right to 
this security?  Sometime they might.  Imagine an employer has listed the qualifications 
she seeks in a job announcement.  In such a case, the prospective employee might have a 
right that the employer make decisions on the basis of the announced criteria.  But what 
grounds this right?   Reliance might.  Perhaps the fact that the prospective employee puts 
time and energy into applying for this job rather than another, because she thinks she is 
better qualified for it given the announced criteria, is sufficient to create an entitlement 
that the employer use those criteria in her selection process.   
 Ultimately, we are unsure about whether reliance (at least in most cases) is 
sufficient to limit the ability of an employer to change her focus.6  But even if it were, the 
claim to predictable decision-making by the employer rests not on a general right to 
nonarbitariness but instead on the specific claim generated by the reliance (or perhaps by 
a promise implied in the announcement of job qualifications). 
 It is important to note, however, that in some special contexts, there are interests 
at stake that require a non-arbitrary procedure.  The criminal justice context provides the 
clearest example here.  A criminal defendant has a right that reasonably accurate 
procedures be used to determine guilt, and as a result has a derivative right that these 
procedures not be arbitrary.  The criminal defendant has such a right because the threat of 
liberty deprivation or the stigma of criminal conviction require accurate procedures for 
assessing guilt.  In other words, interests of special concern give rise to a right to 
accuracy.  This conclusion is consistent with our insistence that there is no general right 
that decisions that affect one not be arbitrary.     
   Perhaps arbitrary is a synonym for unconstrained and the claim of arbitrary 
decision-making is a complaint that a decision is unfairly untethered to any rules and/or 
standards with which it must comply.  This sense of arbitrariness is likely inapt in the 
 
6 Imagine that the employer interviews three candidates, each of whom are strong with 
regard to the qualifications announced in advance.  Upon seeing all of these candidates, 
the employer now sees that her understanding of the qualifications required for the job 
was mistaken.  She decides to hire someone with different qualities altogether.  In this 
scenario, it does not appear that the employer has wronged any of three original 
candidates despite the fact that they relied on the announced job description.   
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context of algorithmic decision-making.  An algorithm is, after all, rule-based. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines an algorithm as "a process or set of rules to be 
followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations, especially by a computer." 
Thus, algorithmic tools are unlikely to be criticized as arbitrary because of their lack of 
constraint. 
 But maybe this is too quick.  The assertion that a decision is arbitrary in the sense 
of “rule-bound” may be understood to require that the rule that governs the decision be 
one that is understandable or reproducible.7  Consider the demand for an understandable 
decision first.  An algorithmic decision might be rule-governed but complex in a way that 
make it difficult or impossible for the person affected to understand just what that rule is.  
If so, one can imagine the prospective employee or borrower asserting that the decision is 
arbitrary.   
 It is easy to see why a job or loan seeker would want to be able to understand the 
rule that governs whether or not she is offered the job or the loan.  But does she have 
such an entitlement?  Suppose that an employer were to make clear that he will hire 
whomever he wants.  There may well be a method to his madness, such that his decisions 
are rule-bound, but it also may be the case that neither he nor the applicants can discern 
what this is.  It is not clear, at least to us, that such a procedure wrongs the applicant.  A 
critic of our view might be likely to point to out that sometimes laws require an 
explanation8 and that this legal requirement supports the idea that a decision must be 
based on explainable reasons.  While this is surely a possible view, the right to an 
explanation can also be supported in different ways.  First, it may help to guard against 
improper reasons affecting decisions (race, sex, etc.).  Second, it may allow prospective 
borrowers to make decisions in their lives that make them more able to secure loans in 
the future.  Third, it allows borrowers to contest inaccurate data.  For example, if the 
lender explains that Jane Doe was denied a loan because she had previously filed for 
bankruptcy and she has not, the explanation requirement allows Jane to correct the data 
on which the algorithm relies.   
 
7  We are grateful to Seth Lazar for pressing this point.   
8  For example, in the United States lenders are required to provide explanations for loan 
denials.  See the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1691(d). 
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 In each of these cases, the function of the explanation is not to ensure that the real 
rule which determines who gets hired or gets a loan is in fact a comprehensible rule, as 
this conception of arbitrariness would require.  Rather, the demand for an explainable 
rule works prophylactically to screen out prohibited factors, aids applicants by pointing 
them to things they can do to improve, and lastly helps to ensure that real rule is applied 
to accurate facts.  Much more could be said about the normative function of explanations 
in these contexts, to be sure.9  Our point here is to suggest that the reasons that support 
explainability take us quite far from notions of arbitrariness.  
 The suggestion that arbitrariness as lack of constraint requires instead that a 
decision be reproduceable is likely to be satisfied in the context of algorithmic 
decisionmaking.  To the extent that the decision is governed by an algorithm, it will 
produce the same result when run on the same inputs.  If the algorithm contains a degree 
of randomness within it (as we propose later), it still is reproducible at a higher level of 
abstraction.   
 Perhaps the worry is not that the algorithm will not yield the same result for a 
particular input – a job or loan applicant for example.  Rather, the worry might be that for 
two relevantly similar applicants, it will not yield the same result.  We address this 
concern later when we consider whether arbitrariness should be understood as a failure to 
treat like cases alike.    
 Third, and most plausibly, we can understand the claim to non-arbitrary decisions 
as a claim that decisions that affect us should be reasonable or sensible.  If so, arbitrary is 
a synonym for unreasonable or irrational.  This idea seems promising, but it is open to 
several variations that we explore in the next section.  
 
2.2  Unreasonable as not good for the public, not good for the person affected or not good 
for the decision-maker 
 
 
9  Indeed, one of the papers in this volume takes on that project.  See Sanford and 
Vredenburgh, “Freedom at Work: Understanding, Alienation, and the AI-Driven 
Workplace.” and also Vredenburgh, “The Right to Explanation.” 
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A complaint that a decision is arbitrary could be understood as a complaint that the 
decision is unreasonable or irrational.  If so, we must determine when a decision is 
reasonable or rational?  There are at least three possible answers to that question.  First, 
perhaps the reason must be public-oriented. Yes, you didn't get the loan but that is 
because if people with your qualifications received loans, there would be so many 
defaults on loans that the housing market would collapse and that would hurt everybody 
(or something along these lines). Second, perhaps the reason must relate to the affected 
individual and her interests. If we gave you this loan, you would likely default and that 
would be bad for you. You would have ruined your credit and set back your ability to 
attain the sort of financial stability you seek.  Third, perhaps the reason need only be a 
reason that relates to the aims or interests of the employer or lender herself. I didn't give 
you the loan because I am unlikely to make a profit by giving you a loan and I want to 
make money in this business. Of these three possibilities, we can see that the first and 
second understanding of what non-arbitrariness requires are more demanding than the 
third. 
 This demandingness is a problem.  In order to argue that a lender who denies a 
loan must do so for a public-oriented reason or because doing so serves the borrower’s 
interests, we must suppose that the lender has a duty to society or to would-be borrowers 
to act for their interests.  While it is not impossible that such a duty exists, more would 
need to be said to support it.  More importantly, if such a duty exists – say a duty for a 
lender to make lending decisions that are good for society overall – a failure to comply 
with this duty would be wrongful but its wrongfulness would relate to this failure to act in 
the interests of society rather than the arbitrariness of its decision.  Another way to put 
this point would be to say that when we understand arbitrariness as acting without good 
reason, and interpret “good reasons” as reasons that serve society, then the violation of 
this duty makes arbitrariness drop out of the equation altogether.  The same point would 
hold with regard to the requirement that a lender act in the interests of the would-be 
borrower.   
We are thus left with the idea that a decision is arbitrary when it does not serve 
the prospective lender or employer’s own interests and is sufficiently rational and non-
arbitrary when it does. In other words, lenders act non-arbitrarily when they deny would-
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be borrowers loans in order to maximize their own profits. In our view, this 
understanding of arbitrariness coheres best with the ordinary meaning of the complaint of 
arbitrary decision-making made by prospective employees and borrowers.   
 
A lender or employer might act arbitrarily in this sense in two ways.  First, the 
lender might act for no reason at all. Second, the lender might act for a reason that does 
not serve her own interests. We next consider each of these possibilities. 
 
2.3  Arbitrary decision-making as decision-making for no reason at all or as lacking 
instrumental rationality 
 
 We begin with the idea that a lender, for example, acts arbitrarily when she acts 
for no reason at all.  This idea is difficult to pin down.  It might mean that the lender does 
not formulate a policy or plan and instead spontaneously decides whether to grant or deny 
loans when a borrower presents herself. This sense of arbitrariness returns us to the 
earlier contrast between the arbitrary and the rule-like or regularized. And, as we noted 
earlier, algorithmic decision-making is not arbitrary in this manner. But an algorithm 
could rely on a randomization procedure. If so, the agent decides whom to select for the 
treatment at issue, like whom to grant a loan, by lottery. Interestingly, lotteries are often 
seen as paradigmatically fair procedures. Still, a person might object when an agent 
decides whether to give him an opportunity, benefit or burden by lottery. 
 The idea behind such a complaint might be as follows: if you are going to deny 
me something important, there should at least be some reason for doing so, even if the 
reason is simply that denying me the opportunity is good for you. But, if you deny me the 
loan for no reason, as would a random procedure like a lottery, this denial fails to take 
my interests seriously. Is the complainant correct about this? 
 The first point to note is that the adoption of a randomization procedure itself 
might be supported by a reason.  A lender or employer might think that the fairest way to 
allocate loans and jobs is by lottery.  In this case, the lender or employer has a reason for 
its action, a particular view of fairness.  This reason might not be one that applicant 
shares and is likely not a reason that serves the lender’s or employer’s own interest but it 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786377
10 
 
is a reason, and indeed one we can understand and appreciate.  As a result, this complaint 
reduces to the assertion that the lender or employer acts wrongly when it doesn’t adopt 
procedures for selecting applicants that serve its own interests.  But why think the lender 
is morally required to pursue self-interest over its own conception of fairness?  To be 
sure, the entity might have obligations to investors that require it to pursue financial self-
interest.  If that is the case, it is the investors, not the applicant, who are wronged. 
We now turn to the claim that a lender or employer acts arbitrarily in a morally 
troubling way when it adopts a selection procedure that is not well-suited to its own aims.  
For example, if the lender's goal to make as much money as possible, the lender should 
want to identify those borrowers that will enable it best to achieve this goal. If the 
algorithmic tool it adopts undermines or frustrates this aim, would-be borrowers are 
subject to arbitrary decision-making, on this understanding of that claim. 
 Before we evaluate this claim, we should point out that there is some further 
ambiguity about the complaint here as well. The borrower could be arguing that the 
algorithmic tool will generally do a good job identifying those borrowers most likely to 
repay loans and take sensible risks, etc. but has misclassified her despite this fact. Or 
alternatively, the borrower could be asserting that the algorithmic tool does not serve its 
purported goal even in the aggregate.  
 
2.4  Lacking means-ends rationality in the aggregate or in the individual case, in fact-
relative or evidence relative terms 
 
 First, consider the claim that the algorithmic tool misclassifies the individual at 
issue. This is a claim that the rule-based decision is either over-inclusive, under-inclusive 
or both. While the individual at issue is a good risk, she is nonetheless denied a loan. But 
is the tool arbitrary according to the definition at issue? It is not. Remember, an arbitrary 
decision is one that does not serve the interests of the lender or employer. While it seems 
that this decision is arbitrary according to this definition because this borrower would be 
a good risk, that answer is too quick. The lender wants to make money and thus wants to 
adopt a tool that makes her the most money. In order to claim that the lender acts 
arbitrarily, the borrower must show that there is another selection method that the lender 
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could adopt that would do a better job of meeting her goals than the one she has adopted. 
Because any tool is likely to be imperfect, merely showing it has erred in an individual 
case does not show it is arbitrary on this definition. Instead, the claim must rest on how 
the tool does over the run of cases, which takes us to the second formulation of the claim. 
10 
 Here the complainant asserts that the actor uses a sorting method that is ill-suited 
to her aims when assessed in the aggregate. Arbitrariness, under this conception, is a 
claim that the selection procedure lacks means/ends or instrumental rationality.  The 
lender’s action is unlikely to achieve her own goals, and this failure of instrumental 
rationality has consequences for the borrower. Given what is at stake for the borrower, 
the lender should at least be using a tool that is well-suited to her own purposes, so the 
argument goes. In our view, we have now arrived close to the heart of the complaint of 
arbitrary algorithmic decision-making. 
 Yet there is still one more layer of ambiguity to unpack. Should this complaint be 
understood in fact-relative or evidence-relative form? Suppose there is good evidence 
supporting the algorithmic tool's reliability in achieving the lender's aim. Is that enough 
to make its use non-arbitrary? If so, then the duty of non-arbitrariness should be 
understood in evidence-relative form. Suppose that despite the evidence supporting the 
tool, it does not do a good job (or a good enough job) of achieving the lender's aim. If the 
obligation is evidence-relative, this would not matter. But, if the obligation is fact-
relative, then the lender's use of the algorithm to determine to whom to offer loans would 
be arbitrary and objectionable for this reason. 
 First consider the more demanding, fact-relative version. If the lender adopts a 
tool that good evidence suggests will enable her to achieve her aim, then it makes sense 
for her to use it. Reasonable, rational action that is thereby non-arbitrary, according to the 
definition we are using, is action that is conducive to the attainment of the agent’s own 
aims. While the tool will not in fact serve the agent's interests, an agent generally serves 
her own interests by adopting policies that evidence suggests with further them. In other 
words, the fact-relative version of the obligation seems problematic because it directs an 
 
10 See Schauer (2003).  
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actor to do what evidence suggests she should not.  For this reason, the evidence-relative 
formulation is the more plausible understanding of the claim.  We consider it next.   
 On this interpretation, the would-be borrower asserts that the lender adopts an 
algorithmic tool that good evidence suggests would not achieve the lender's own goal. 
For this reason, denying the borrower a loan is arbitrary. We have finally arrived at the 
heart of the claim, but in doing so are able to see what an odd claim it is. Essentially, the 
borrower is saying to the lender: you have a duty to others affected by your actions to do 
what seems reasonably likely to be good for you. Why would one think there is such a 
duty? When I am pursuing my own aims, why should I have a duty to pursue them more 
efficiently rather than less efficiently? When others are affected, I surely should take their 
interests into account and consider whether their interests should outweigh my own but 
the fact that I should take the interests of others into account does not give rise to an 
obligation for me to serve my own interests well.  There is thus no general obligation for 
actors to adopt procedures that are non-arbitrary.  
 
2.5  Acting for bad reasons 
 We argue that there is no general duty to act for non-arbitrary reasons.  But we 
recognize and affirm that there are bad reasons on which an employer or lender might act.  
Were an employer to refuse to hire a qualified applicant because of her minority race, for 
example, this decision wrongs the applicant.  It wrongs the applicant not because the 
decision is arbitrary, however.  Indeed, using race or sex as a proxy for other traits that an 
employer or lender seeks is sometimes, unfortunately, instrumentally rational in the sense 
that race, sex, and other legally protected traits are often positively correlated with these 
other traits.11  That said, prohibitions on irrational decision-making by employers, lenders 
and others or demands that these actions comply with instrumental rationality could be 
useful in helping to avoid or detect race or sex-based decisions.  In U.S. Constitutional 
law, for example, it is often said that so-called “rationality review” helps to “smoke out” 
 
11 The term “statistical discrimination” is used to refer to the rational use of race, sex, and 
other legally prohibited traits as proxies for other traits.  The fact that the rational use of 
race and sex as proxies for other traits is legally prohibited provides some support for the 
view that instrumental rationality is unrelated to moral permissibility.  See generally, 
Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong?, Chapter 5.     
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illegitimate governmental purposes.12 Whether a prohibition on arbitrariness is equally 
useful in the context of algorithmic decisions is unclear and we express no view about it.  
Either way, the relevant point for our purposes is that the irrationality of the action is not 
problematic in itself, but only because it works to screen out or smoke out decisions that 
are bad for other reasons.   
 
2.6  Treating like cases alike 
 
 Before we consider whether arbitrariness at scale presents different moral 
problems than arbitrariness in the individual case, we examine a challenge to the 
argument just presented.  While individuals may have no moral claim that selectors adopt 
procedures that are well suited to the selector’s own aims, perhaps people have a related 
claim that the selection procedure at least treats like cases alike.  The treat likes alike 
[TLA] principle surely has some intuitive appeal.13  Suppose we interpret TLA to say that 
cases that are alike with respect to the purpose of the selection rule should be treated 
alike.  We should begin by noting that TLA does not require that the selection tool be 
rational given the goals that its designers aim to achieve.  For example, if the algorithmic 
tool mischaracterizes A (who should be selected given the tool’s purpose but is not), then 
the TLA principle directs that the tool should also mischaracterize B (who is like A with 
respect to the purpose of the rule).  If an algorithmic selection tool does not treat likes 
 
12  See e.g. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("the purpose 
of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative 
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test 
also ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little 
or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or 
stereotype.") 
   
13  There is a longstanding debate among legal scholars about whether the treat likes alike 
principle is empty.  See e.g.Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality.” Westen ignited a 
vigorous exchange with this article.  For some representative examples of the replies, see 
Chemerinsky, “In Defense of Equality”; Greenawalt, “How Empty Is the Idea of 
Equality”; Waldron and Westen, “The Substance of Equality”; Peters, “Foolish 
Consistency.” 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786377
14 
 
alike, then perhaps the tool is arbitrary in a problematic way that we have not yet 
considered. 
 While the claim that a failure to treat like cases alike sounds like a new and 
different conception of arbitrariness, this charge actually restates one of the conceptions 
of arbitrariness we considered earlier. There are two ways in which we might understand 
the TLA principle.  First, it might require the consistent application of the selection rule 
at issue.  If so, TLA demands that the procedure be rule-like.  An employer or lender 
cannot deploy the selection algorithm in some cases and ignore it in others.  Or, if she 
does so, then we should describe the selection procedure at a higher level of abstraction 
as including both the algorithm and the human decision maker who determines whether 
to follow or ignore the result suggested by the algorithm.  If non-arbitrariness requires 
rule-like consistency, then this demand is unlikely to be the problem when algorithms 
decide treatments, as we noted earlier. 
 Alternatively, the charge of failure to comply with the TLA is aimed not at the 
application of the rule, but instead at its content.  Here the complaint is that the rule itself, 
even when applied consistently, fails to treat like cases alike.  But, as Peter Westen’s 
canonical criticism of this principle makes plain, people (or other “cases”) are not like or 
unalike others inherently.  Rather, they are like or unalike with respect to some purpose.  
A tall man and a short woman who are equally skilled at widget making are likes with 
respect to selecting the best widget makers and unalike with respect to choosing the best 
players for the men’s basketball team.  Suppose the short woman (Jane) is selected but 
the tall man (Joe) is passed over by the algorithm tasked with selecting the best widget 
makers.  In such a case, the algorithm has failed to treat cases that are alike, with respect 
to the purpose of rule, as alike.  As a result, the algorithm is not as good as it might be at 
its task.  If a better algorithm could identify all the people who are similarly good widget 
makers, this would be a better algorithm and the company looking to identify workers 
would better achieve its goals by adopting it.  The failure to comply with the TLA 
principle thus asserts the familiar complaint – which we rejected earlier – that the 
algorithmic tool does not serve the ends of the person or institution deploying it as well as 
it could.  Whenever this occurs, it is likely to lead to dissimilar treatment of people who 
are alike with respect to the tool’s aims.  While such dissimilar treatment of similar cases 
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may be frustrating to applicants for jobs, loans, admission, etc. it is not, in our view, of 
moral concern.  
 In this section, we have canvased different ways of understanding the charge of 
arbitrariness, especially as lodged against algorithmic decision-making.  After discussing 
and rejecting various possibilities, we concluded that a charge of arbitrariness is best 
understood as the claim that the employer, lender or other actor has adopted a screening 
tool that fails to achieve its own ends as well as it might.  As such, this charge has no 
obvious moral force.  If an employer or lender has adopted an inefficient means to 
achieve its own ends, that is unfortunate but, without more, does not wrong others.  The 
more that can make a difference include cases where employers and lenders have made 
commitments to applicants to decide according to certain criteria or invited reliance on 
announced factors or processes.14  In such cases, the employer or lender may wrong 
applicants if the selection procedure is not as promised or announced.  But the reason the 
employer or lender wrongs applicants in such cases is not because the selection process is 
arbitrary but instead because they have broken their promise or invited detrimental 
reliance.  That said, we recognize that an insistence of rational, non-arbitrary decision-
making by employers and lenders can, at times, help to screen out impermissible use of 
impermissible traits like race and sex.  But, again, this argument does not establish that 
arbitrariness itself is of moral concern.    
    
3 Arbitrariness at Scale 
 In the last section, we concluded that the use by an employer or lender of an 
arbitrary algorithm does not wrong applicants.  In such a case, the algorithm indicates 
that a particular individual should not be hired or offered a loan despite the fact that she is 
qualified.  In addition, a better algorithm could have been adopted which would 
distinguish between qualified and unqualified applicants in a manner that better allows 
the employer or lender to achieve its own goals.  If this algorithm is used not only by one 
particular employer or lender but by many, does this change the moral calculus?  And if 
so, why? 
 
14 Similarly, special contexts like criminal justice in which the interests at stake give rise 
to duties of accuracy provide distinct reasons that arbitrariness is morally problematic.    




3.1 Why arbitrariness at scale arises 
 
Arbitrariness at scale is not a hypothetical concern. It stems from one of the 
essential challenges of machine learning:  the difficulty of ensuring that the model learns 
neither too little nor too much.  The model that learns too much “overfits”: it memorizes 
the training data rather than learning generalizable patterns, or it learns patterns based on 
the noise in the training data that fail to generalize beyond the initial context.  The model 
that learns too little “underfits”: it misses generalizable patterns present in its training 
data.   
 A model that overfits by learning accidental patterns in the dataset is learning 
arbitrary features.  For example, many algorithmic decision-making systems are based on 
opaque machine learning algorithms such as deep learning.15 Deep learning is known to 
suffer from "adversarial examples," or cases in which very small perturbations of the 
input data can lead to failures in prediction or wildly different classifications. Ilyas et. al. 
have argued that "adversarial examples can be directly attributed to the presence of 
features derived from patterns in the data distribution that are highly predictive, yet brittle 
and incomprehensible to humans."16  If this is true, then some multi-dimensional feature 
correlated with the input data "purple-shoelace-wearer + scratches right ear often + 
square forehead" may be highly predictive relative to the original training data. The 
arbitrary feature that is being uniformly enforced by the classifier might be one of this 
kind. 
 If so, the arbitrary feature is a product of overfitting.  The classifier has found 
features that are responsive to patterns present in the data used to train the algorithm, but 
not to the patterns that track the real-life phenomena the modelers intended to represent. 
The model's ability to successfully classify, as measured by the original developers of the 
algorithm during the training process, might turn out to be fully dependent on overfitting 
and thus on accidental features in the data. A classic example is an image classifier that 
 
15 Creel, “Transparency in Complex Computational Systems”; Zednik, “Solving the 
Black Box Problem.” 
16 Ilyas et al., “Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features.” 
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heavily relies on the presence of snow to distinguish wolves from dogs, perhaps because 
shy wolves are often photographed with telephoto lenses across barren wintry expanses.17 
The classifier’s reliance on snow reflects a real property of the dataset - wolves are 
photographed more often in the snow - but not a property of wolves themselves.  Were 
this classifier to be tested on photographs of wolves in a very different environment, such 
as rescued wolves photographed indoors while being treated at a veterinary clinic, its 
success at identifying wolves would plummet.  More importantly for our purposes, the 
classifier would divide photographs into “contains wolf” and “no wolf” categories based 
on the presence or absence of snow, an arbitrary feature. 
 A more recent and real-world example is that of the automated diagnostic system 
that learned to diagnose pneumonia based on lung scans. Its apparent success did not 
generalize beyond the hospital in which it was trained because, as it turned out, all it 
"recognized" was the difference between lung scans produced in the hospital itself and 
those produced using the portable scanner in the ambulance, which stamped its images 
with the word PORTABLE.18  As people with pneumonia were far more likely to be 
transported to the hospital by ambulance and scanned while in transit, so too their scans 
were far more likely to be recognizably stamped.  
 Automated decision-making systems that over-fit by learning an accidental 
pattern in the dataset (i.e. that are arbitrary) will produce systematic disadvantage to some 
number of people.  This is because the classifier has identified a consistent set of features 
that it can systematically enforce to exclude the same people, but the consistent set of 
features does not generalize beyond the training data. For example, perhaps every one of 
the small number of people in the initial training dataset who attended Mt. Holyoke 
College happen to be rated as terrible employees or to have fully defaulted on loans. Job 
seekers and loan applicants who attended Mt. Holyoke College might then be 
systematically denied despite their other qualifications.  Mt. Holyoke attendance is thus 
 
17 See Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin, “‘Why Should I Trust You?’: Explaining the 
Predictions of Any Classifier,” 8–9. This classifier was intentionally trained to be an 
example of a "bad" classifier, but it represents a common trend. 
 
18 Zech et al., “Variable Generalization Performance of a Deep Learning Model to Detect 
Pneumonia in Chest Radiographs: A Cross-Sectional Study.” 
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an arbitrary reason for job application denial.  It is arbitrary because reliance on this 
feature does not serve the employer’s own interests.  
 Likewise, a feature in an algorithmic decision-making system might be a 
compound of a feature genuinely related to job performance and an arbitrary data artifact. 
Goh calls these types of features "contaminated."19  In such a case, a job seeker or loan 
applicant might argue that although something about their data as provided to the model 
reliably triggers a hidden feature in the automated classifier that causes their job file to be 
thrown away, it is unfair because the feature is "contaminated." It too is based on 
overfitting and thus on an arbitrary artifact of the way the model originally learned from 
data and not on any feature of the person themselves. Does this mean that the algorithm 
treats this individual applicant unfairly? We argued that it does not. 
 However, if the same algorithm is used by many employers, the effect will be not 
only to screen out this applicant from this particular job, which also would occur if one 
employer had idiosyncratic preferences or theories about what makes a good employee, 
but to screen the prospective employee out from employment with many other employers 
as well. This systemic effect matters because of the scale of the exclusion. 
 The conceptually simplest solution would be for the state to break up the 
algorithmic monopoly by making it illegal to allow either one company or one company's 
algorithms to dominate an entire sector of hiring or lending. We encourage this and 
expect that it would have a host of salutary outcomes beyond the discouragement of 
algorithmic leviathans. 
 However, avoiding monopolistic power may not be sufficient to avoid uniformity 
of outcome. If the machine learning algorithms train on the same or similar data, ensuring 
a diversity of companies and algorithms will not be enough to avoid the creation of an 
Algorithmic Leviathan. Since uniformity in outcome has been observed in the case of 
"Imagenet," we use this example to illustrate the point that training different algorithms 
on the same data can lead to the same result. 
 The "Imagenet" database is a collection 14 million images, each hand-labeled 
with the primary contents of the image, such as "dog" or "strawberry." Its maintainers 
 
19 Engstrom et al., “A Discussion of ‘Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are 
Features.’” 
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host the widely respected "ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge," a 
competition to identify images from a curated sub-set of one thousand non-overlapping 
categories. It is unfortunate but not surprising that machine learning models trained on 
ImageNet share similar biases. More surprising was that many of the competition 
winning machine learning models have similar artifacts.  
 These artifacts stem from features of the Imagenet database rather than from the 
task of image recognition itself. Like any finite collection of images, Imagenet has certain 
peculiarities. Although it is large, it is a non-representative subset of possible visual 
experiences of the world. Gains in performance sometimes come from capitalizing on 
features peculiar to the database rather than generalizable features of the image categories 
themselves.  For example, Hendrycks et. al. point out the existence of “natural adversarial 
examples,” namely real, unaltered photographs which are misclassified with high 
confidence.20  The photos reveal that Imagenet classifiers rely heavily on cues from the 
background of photographs and especially on “textures.”  In the images below, a squirrel 
and dragonfly are both mis-classified with high confidence because they are in unusual 
locations with heavily textured backgrounds.  
  
 The ImageNet problem occurs in many forms of data beyond images. Indeed, we 
should expect it to occur more often in other domains than it does in image recognition. 
Image recognition datasets are large because images are relatively cheap to produce and 
label.  Despite the expense of hand-labeling them, images themselves are relatively cheap 
to produce or to source on the Internet. The ImageNet team in particular has produced a 
 
20 Hendrycks et al., “Natural Adversarial Examples.” 
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vast training corpus by paying workers on MechanicalTurk to label millions of images.  
The ImageNet team can use the labor of workers on MechanicalTurk because images of 
dragonflies and squirrels can be labeled by almost anyone, unlike images of tumors. 
 In other domains, gathering large amounts of high-quality data is expensive, even 
before the expense of labeling the data. This shapes what kinds of data exist in these 
domains. In some domains, only a few public datasets will be available. If only a few 
datasets are easily available, even firms that are rivals are likely to train their machine 
learning models on those datasets. 
 For example, deep learning algorithms used for clinical and medical purposes 
disproportionately use data from only three states, drawing "cohorts from California, 
Massachusetts, and New York, with little to no representation from the remaining 47 
states."21 This is likely both because the rich hospitals in those states are the hospitals 
most capable both of running studies using deep learning and of producing the kind and 
scale of data appropriate for deep learning. Kaushal et. al. rightly stress that since these 
models have been trained on a small and un-representative subset of states, they are 
unlikely to generalize successfully to populations in the other 47 states. Such failures of 
generalization are important and often commented upon. However, a less frequently 
discussed factor highlighted by this example is that concentration and similarity of data 
leads to standardization. Medical diagnostics in all state will now rely on a small number 
of algorithms that were themselves trained on data representing a relatively small and 
uniform cohort. 
 Publicly available datasets also prompt standardization of algorithms for the same 
reason. Cheap, widely available datasets will cause standardization because they will be 
used for training or pre-training. The supply-side availability of readily accessible 
databases may lead companies to choose them rather than gathering their own data, thus 
pushing them towards standardization. There may be further bottlenecks depending on 
the domain. Trainers of automated decision-making systems for lending or hiring may 
face legal restrictions on what kind of data may legally be used. 
 
21 Kaushal, Altman, and Langlotz, “Geographic Distribution of US Cohorts Used to Train 
Deep Learning Algorithms.” 
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 Automated decision-making systems with coordinated pressures on their datasets 
are likely to be highly standardized, even if the automated decision-making systems are 
trained by different groups. This will lead not just to failures of generalization but 
systematic failures of generalization. Algorithms trained on the same or similar datasets 
are likely to identify the same people, or rather the same application files, as worthy or 
unworthy of hiring or lending. For all these reasons, we may suspect that the outcomes 
will be coordinated at scale even when the same algorithm is not applied at scale. 
 
3.2 Why systemic exclusion matters 
 
 If arbitrary decision-making is not morally troubling at the individual level, does 
anything change when that arbitrariness goes to scale? Rather than one employer with a 
screening tool that does a poor job of identifying good employees, as the employer 
herself might define them, we have instead a hiring tool used by many employers that 
irrationally excludes some group of potential employees. Rather than one bank with a 
poor method of determining who should be offered a loan, many banks, relying on the 
same flawed data sets about potential borrowers, irrationally excludes some borrowers 
from most prime loans. Does the scale at which the irrationality now operates make a 
moral difference?  
 One potential worry is that the people affected by such systemic arbitrariness 
might not be just some random group of people. Instead, they might be members of 
groups protected by antidiscrimination law. In other words, what appeared to be simply 
irrational in the individual case may turn out to be disparate impact discrimination at 
scale.  We agree that policies and practices that produce a disparate negative impact on 
vulnerable groups (like racial minorities) are morally problematic.  In such cases, 
arbitrariness becomes relevant, but only indirectly.  If legal regimes are an appropriate 
guide, then disparate impact can be justified by business necessity or some reason in this 
vein.  When a selection process is arbitrary – meaning not well suited to achieve the 
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employer’s or lender’s own aims – it surely will be unable to meet this justificatory 
burden.22 
 The “group” of people affected by an irrational screening tool need not overlap 
with a vulnerable or protected group however.  In such cases, what worries us is that the 
systematicity of these flawed tools means that a person affected in one context will likely 
be affected in multiple contexts.  Because the tool is used in multiple settings, such as an 
automated tool for determining credit-worthiness, the exclusion will apply across 
multiple actors, lenders in this example, such that a person negatively affected will not 
find respite from another lender.  
 This exclusion from multiple opportunities is of moral concern in itself.  When an 
individual is excluded from important opportunities – employment, loans, education, etc. 
– this has a significant impact on her life in ways that many different moral theories are 
likely to find objectionable.  The problem could be that she is unable to develop an 
adequate range of capacities,23 has insufficient opportunity for genuine freedom or 
autonomy,24 is among the least well-off in ways that require remediation,25 or is 
consistently excluded from opportunities in a way that establishes a social hierarchy of 
esteem or domination.26 Exclusion from a broad swath of opportunity in an important 
sector of life is likely to be morally problematic.  We will not argue for this assertion here 
because doing so would require its own article or book length treatment itself.27  
However, we do note that this argument makes two features of the systemic effect 
relevant.  First, the degree of exclusion.  If the algorithmic tool is not in fact an 
Algorithmic Leviathan and is used by one or two employers only, then the exclusion is 
less severe.  That said, if different tools are based on the same data sets, then even with 
different screening tools, we may still have an Algorithmic Leviathan.  Second, the 
 
22 Arbitrariness would matter indirectly in the same way in subgroup or “intersectional” 
cases in which the people affected are not a legally protected group but a sub-set of two 
or more such groups – Asian-American women, for example.    
23 Sen, “Equality of What?”; Sen, “Capability and Well‐Being”; Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities. 
24 Raz, The Morality of Freedom. 
25 Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
26 Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” 
27 See e.g.  Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity (2014). 
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importance of the good, service or domain from which one is excluded also matters.  We 
have focused here on employment and lending, which are important domains of 
opportunity. When the algorithmic tool affects a less important area of life, the moral 
concern is less grave.    
 Hiring and lending are similar to one another in that they are realms of 
opportunity. The offer of a job or a loan expands an individual's opportunities, giving 
them more choices and access to life paths than they had before. For that reason, when a 
single or a few companies dominate these areas, we rightly worry about the effects on 
people’s lives, and the ways that institutions with significant social power may limit 
people’s opportunities and produce harms that are cumulative.  These same worries are 
present however when multiple companies and or lending institutions use the same (or 
few) algorithmic tools to screen employees or prospective borrowers. An algorithmic 
leviathan that successfully captured the whole hiring or lending market would establish a 
monopoly of opportunity.     
 It is important to note however that the monopolistic harm we call attention to, 
namely being denied a significant number of opportunities, are present whether the 
algorithmic tool is rational or arbitrary.  So why does arbitrariness matter?  The 
systematicity gives rise to the sorts of harms that limit opportunities to the degree that 
require justification.  When the screening tool is arbitrary, it lacks such justification.  
However, when it is rational, the reason for it may still not be sufficient when the 
exclusionary harms are great.  After all, what makes it nonarbitrary is simply that it helps 
the company achieve its own aims.  When the harms of tool become truly monopolistic, 
even this justification may not be sufficient.  
 To recap, arbitrariness at scale is of moral concern because it produces systemic 
exclusion from important opportunities.  As a result, is the systematicity, not the 
arbitrariness that matters morally.  Arbitrariness does matter sometimes, but only 
indirectly.  Just as a screening tool that produces a disparate impact on a vulnerable group 
requires a justification, so too a screening too that excludes individuals from a wide 
swath of an important domain of opportunity also requires justification.  When the tool is 
arbitrary, in that it does not even achieve the lender’s or employer’s own aims very well, 
it lacks this justification.  The practical upshot of this analysis is that a remedy should be 
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aimed at disrupting systematicity, rather than taking aim at arbitrariness.  We turn to 
these solutions in the next section.  
 
 
4 Technical Solutions 
 How should the problem of systemic arbitrariness be addressed? In theory, we 
could address the arbitrariness by finding all individuals who have been mis-classified 
and correcting the error of their classification, or by finding all arbitrary features and 
removing them.  However, we suspect that this will be procedurally difficult. If it were 
possible to algorithmically identify the individuals who had been mis-classified, they 
would not have been mis-classified in the first place. We could address the algorithmic 
error by adding a “human in the loop” to check the results, perhaps by evaluating a 
randomly selected subset of the classifications using a different method.  This is 
equivalent to adding a second and separate classification method, namely classification 
by human judgment, and applying it to a randomly selected subset of the results. In fact, 
adding a second classification method can be accomplished without a human in the loop, 
and this strategy will be part of our positive proposal.  But recall, the heart of the problem 
of systemic arbitrariness lies in its systematicity rather than its arbitrariness, as non-
arbitrary screening tools that significantly limit opportunities have only a weak reason to 
offer in response to the harm they cause.  With that in mind, we offer solutions aimed at 
disrupting systematicity rather than at minimizing arbitrariness.    
 Identifying the mis-classified groups will be equally difficult. As we mentioned 
earlier, although we focus primarily on the moral dimension of standardizing a choice 
based on purely arbitrary features, it is important to note that in many cases seemingly 
arbitrary features will in fact be correlated with axes of existing discrimination.  As 
Barocas and Levy note, “decisions rendered on the basis of characteristics that lack social 
salience may still result in disparities along socially salient lines. In many cases, newly 
identified groups might map closely to traditional social groups because many of the 
relevant points of similarity will be correlated with protected characteristics.”28 Although 
 
28 Barocas and Levy, “Privacy Dependencies.” 
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such a mapping may exist, bias against individuals who fall into more than one group that 
has historically been discriminated against may be more difficult to discover in opaque 
automated decision-making systems. For example, one proposal for a way to reduce bias 
in contemporary algorithmic decision-making systems is to "audit" the systems by 
running them through a series of tests and check for plausibility, robustness, and 
fairness.29  Although intersectional identities can be modeled,30 disadvantage to 
intersectional groups may nevertheless be more difficult to identify using a method such 
as algorithmic auditing, especially if the group has few members in the dataset or if one 
of the axes is not a historical axis of discrimination.31 Kearns et. al. have formalized this 
problem and demonstrated that auditing for statistical fairness for subgroups is 
computationally hard in the worst case but can be reasonably approximated.32 However, 
the authors set a threshold on the size of the subgroup for their approximation, allowing 
them to ignore the misclassification of a subgroup if it is small relative to the size of the 
whole.33  By contrast, we are interested in the problem of persistently misclassifying even 
one person, our “algorithmic Job.”34   
 It might be difficult for an auditor or even an affected person to prove that a 
complex nexus of intersecting identities caused this algorithmic decision-making system 
to uniformly misclassify her. However, on our framework the issue can be redressed even 
if the auditing tools or explanatory resources are not sufficiently nuanced to identify the 
pathway by which they arose. 
 Machine learning methods are typically designed to produce a single, optimal 
model, given a problem formulation and data. However, many problems have the 
 
29 Raji and Buolamwini, “Actionable Auditing.” 
30 Bright, Malinsky, and Thompson, “Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory.” 
31 Carbado, “Colorblind Intersectionality.” 
32 Kearns et al., “Preventing Fairness Gerrymandering,” 4. 
33 Kearns et al., 2. 
34 Kearns et. al. find this problem uncompelling, arguing that “we cannot insist on any 
notion of statistical fairness for every subgroup of the population: for example, any 
imperfect classifier could be accused of being unfair to the subgroup of individuals 
defined ex-post as the set of individuals it misclassified.  This simply corresponds to 
“overfitting” a fairness constraint.”  We agree that it is not unfair to misclassify a ex-post 
defined subgroup once, which is why we argue that the problem is systematic exclusion. 
Kearns et al., 2. 
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property of multiplicity: they can be solved equally well with more than one equally 
optimal (or near-optimal) model.35 In choosing the single best model of the ones 
available, the learning system may reject many other possible models with equally good 
or only slightly inferior results. This choice is non-arbitrary in the sense of instrumental 
rationality: the learning system chooses the best model (or a best model) according to its 
metric of success, thereby performing as well as it can by its own lights. However, 
predictive multiplicity results show us that in some cases there can be many equally 
optimal models that have the same statistical performance but deliver different token 
predictions. In these cases, there is no self-interested reason to choose one of the optimal 
models over any of the others.   
The following hypothetical illustrates the sort of case in which this will arise.   
Imagine a pool of applicants for a job consisting of 1000 people, of whom 10 are the 
most qualified applicants and the rest are unqualified.  Call the most qualified applicants 
Alice, Bob, Carmelita, DeAndre, Erika, etc.  The most successful classifier might 
recommend the first nine most qualified applicants, Alice through Indira, but reject the 
tenth, Juan, leaving it with a 99.99% success rate. An equally successful classifier might 
accept Bob through Juan but reject Alice, leaving it with equally good 99.99% success.  
A third classifier, only slightly less successful than the other two, might reject Bob and 
Carmelita but accept the other eight, leaving it with a 99.98% success rate.  Thus, the 
differences between the most successful classifiers might be differences in success on 
individuals rather than differences in optimality, as in this case where classifiers have 
similar performance but different false negatives. 
One approach to the joint problems of multiplicity and systematicity is to 
intentionally introduce randomness to the classifier. Some machine learning researchers 
have proposed creating a diverse set of classifiers and then randomly selecting one from 
 
35 Marx, Calmon, and Ustun, “Predictive Multiplicity in Classification.” Marx et. al cite 
Breiman’s discussion of the Rashomon effect as a precursor to their formalization of 
predictive multiplicity and impossibility results in the fairness literature as fellow 
travellers: see Breiman, “Statistical Modeling”; Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan, 
“Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores”; Chouldechova, “Fair 
Prediction with Disparate Impact”; Corbett-Davies et al., “Algorithmic Decision Making 
and the Cost of Fairness.”  
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the set for each decision, thereby creating "random classifier ensembles".36  Recall the 
case presented earlier of multiple classifiers with similar performance at identifying the 
job best candidates.  Rather than arbitrarily choosing exactly one of the two best models, 
thereby denying Alice or Juan all employment opportunities at companies who use the 
model, a random classifier ensemble incorporates many such models that fall above a 
threshold of performance.  In any token decision, a classifier is chosen randomly from 
among the group.  Thus Alice, Bob, Carmelita, and Juan will all have the opportunity to 
be short-listed for job opportunities despite each being excluded by at least one of the 
models. 
Random classifier ensembles represent one possible way to reduce the hegemonic 
control of a single algorithmic decider. Increasing randomness within a single algorithm 
is an improvement over a single algorithmic leviathan.  Randomness reduces 
standardization and thereby the systemic exclusion from opportunity.  And classifier 
ensembles, in particular, address multiplicity: the fact that the optimal model choice is 
often only minimally better than the next best alternative, or no better at all.  They allow 
competing classifiers to exist within the same model.  Furthermore, we expect that each 
classifier relies on some arbitrary features.  When we are unable to remove the 
arbitrariness, we may at least reduce the impact of any particular arbitrary feature. 
In this example, because systemic exclusion is of moral concern and the loss to 
the employer or lender from introducing this method is either non-existent or small, we 
recommend introducing randomization.  The case for randomization is stronger still in 
contexts in which the algorithm relies on many arbitrary features and does not do a good 
job of achieving its aims.  Rather than leaving out only one or two of the qualified 
applicants, imagine a screening tool that identifies only two or three qualified applicants 
among the ten it puts forward.  While clearly it would be good for this algorithm to be 
improved, if errors are to remain it is better for these errors to be distributed rather than 
concentrated.  Introducing randomization achieves this aim as well.  In saying so, we are 
not endorsing the use of poor selection devices.  The lender or employer itself will surely 
be motivated to improve its screening tool to achieve its ends.  Rather the point is that at 
 
36 Grgić-Hlača et al., “On Fairness, Diversity and Randomness in Algorithmic Decision 
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any given time, the employer or lender is likely to be using a tool that it believes is a 
good one.  If the employer or lender is correct about this, introducing randomness helps 
distribute opportunity without loss to the employer or lender in most cases, given 
multiplicity.  And if the employer or lender is mistaken and the tool it is using is flawed 
and relies on many arbitrary features, introducing randomness will distribute that burden 




 To conclude, we suggest one additional reason to encourage the use of random 
classifier ensembles and other techniques meant to introduce randomness to the realms of 
algorithmic decision-making for hiring and lending. That is that using automated 
decision-making systems in both realms risk implying more precision than the subject 
matter of hiring or lending affords. 
 There are many ways to contribute to a team or an organization and therefore 
many kinds of good employees. Not all the factors that make an employee good are likely 
to be measured correctly or represented in the input data, and thus they will not be part of 
the optimization. Optimizing too far risks over-reliance on data known to be limited. 
 Randomization addresses the harms of systemic exclusion, when it is arbitrary 
and nonarbitrary.  It allows many firms to run the same algorithm on the same applicants 
but (sometimes) get different results. It thus addresses both the moral and practical 
problems we raise and constitutes an improvement on the current state of the field. 
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